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Abstract
In this paper we prove the existence, uniqueness and saddle-point stability of the steady
state (or balanced growth path) of the Romer (1990) model by utilizing the reduction of dimen-
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1 Introduction
Endogenous growth theory has greatly improved economists understanding of how technological
change generates persistent economic growth. Romers (1990) model of Endogenous Technological
Change, is the most inuential endogenous growth model with costly R&D activities. Romer
(1990) solves a steady state (or a balanced growth path) by an ingenious conjecture and develops
important economic intuitions on the steady state, leaving the proof of the uniqueness and saddle-
point stability of the steady state open.
In the literature, some authors have talked in part about this issue. By simplifying the Romer
model, Arnold (2000a, 2000b) examines the saddle-point stability of a conjectured steady state for
the monopolistic competitive equilibrium and the social optimum respectively. This simplication
misses some important information, such as how to comprehend and write down the consumers
budget constraint correctly. Asada, Semmler and Novak (1998) investigates attentively the steady
state of the social optimum in the Romer model in a very complicated way. By introducing
the complementarity between the intermediate goods or externalities, other authors derive more
complex dynamics such as (expectational) indeterminacy (Benhabib, Perri and Xie, 1994; Asada,
Semmler and Novak, 1998; Evan, Honkapohja and Romer, 1998) and Hopf bifurcation (Slobodyan,
2007).
In this paper, we solve the Romer model by changing a four-dimensional dynamic system
describing the Romer economy into a three-dimensional one. This method of reduction of di-
mensionality is developed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) and used by Benhabib and Perli
(1994) and Benhabib, Perri and Xie (1994). We prove that the steady state exists uniquely and
is saddle-point stable in both the decentralized economy and the social planner economy. That
is, we give a complete characterization of the solution of the Romer model. Besides, due to the
welfare loss of the monopoly production of the producer durables, the equilibrium growth rate
is lower than the optimal growth rate in the Romer model. We want to examine whether the
government does play a role in reducing the welfare cost. For this purpose, we indeed introduce
a set of policy instruments which improving the monopolistic competitive equilibrium allocation
up to social optimum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we solve the decentralized
economy of the Romer model and prove the existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state.
In section 3, we examine the social planner economy. In section 4, we introduce a set of policy
rules in the decentralized economy to support the social optimum. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 The decentralized economy of the Romer (1990) model
2.1 The model set-up and the equilibrium dynamic system
There are three sectors in the production side of the economy: a nal-good sector, an intermediate-
goods sector and a research sector. The nal-good sector utilizes human capital, HY t, labor, L,
and all intermediate goods, fxit; i 2 [0; At]g, to produce the nal good with the generalized Cobb-
Douglas production function, Yt = H

Y tL

R At
i=0 x
1  
it di. The prot maximization problem of the
representative rm in the nal-good sector is:
max
HY t;L;xit
HY tL

Z At
i=0
x1  it di  wHtHY t   wLtL 
Z At
i=0
pitxitdi:
The marginal productivity conditions for human capital and raw labor force are1:
H 1Y t L
x1  t At = wHt; H

Y tL
 1x1  t At = wLt; (1)
and the (inverse) demand function for intermediate good i is
pit = H

Y tL
 (1    )x  it ; i 2 [0; At] : (2)
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistic rm. The decision process of any mo-
nopolistic rm can be separated into two steps. Step 1: it pays the price PAt to buy the patent
for producing intermediate good i in the competitive patents market, which is the sunk cost for
the monopolistic rm. Since the patents market is competitive, the price of new design i is the dis-
counted present value of the prots ow extracted by rm i, i.e., PAt =
R1
=t  exp
 
 
R 
s=t rsds

d .2
Di¤erentiating it on both sides with respect to t yields the di¤erential equation of PAt,

PAt = rtPAt   t: (3)
Step 2: in the monopoly pricing problem, monopolistic rm i rents capital (as variable costs) and
produces intermediate good i to meet the demand of the nal-good sector for its products, i.e.,
(2). It is assumed that the unit cost for any intermediate good is the same  (> 0) units of capital.
Solving the monopoly pricing problem of any intermediate good i, namely, it = max
pit;xit
pitxit rtxit,
we have the symmetric monopolistic pricing formula:
pit =
rt
(1    )
 pt; (4)
where rt is the marginal cost for producing additional unit of any intermediate good, and
1= (1    ) (> 1) is the mark-up over the marginal cost. Thus all monopolistic rms set the
1Notice that the expressions for the marginal productivity conditions have utilized the symmetric property of
the model that will be derived in the subsequent analysis.
2We omit the superscript of P iAt because of the derived symmetric property of the model.
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same monopoly price pt, produce the same amount xt (due to (2)), and earn the same monopoly
prot t = (+ ) ptxt. Furthermore, the total capital stock is related to the durable goods that
are actually used in production by the rule Kt =
R At
i=0 xitdi = xtAt.
The research sector uses the knowledge stock At and human capital HAt to produce new
knowledge, namely,

At = AtHAt = At (H  HY t) ; (5)
where the second equality follows from the fact that the sum of the human capital used in the
research sector HAt and in the nal-good sector HY t must be equal to the total stock of human
capital in the economy H. Free mobility and no arbitrage require that the rental rate of human
capital must be equal in the research sector and in the nal-good sector, namely,
PAtAt = wHt = H
 1
Y t L
x1  t At: (6)
The representative consumers utility maximization problem is summerized as follows:
max
Ct;Kt
Z 1
t=0
e t
C1 t   1
1  
dt;
subject to the ow budget constraint (FBC)3:

Kt = wHtHY t + wLtL+ rtKt +
Z At
i=0
itdi  Ct; (7)
where  2 (0; 1) is the time discount rate and 1= 2 (0;+1) is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS). The Euler equation is:

Ct=Ct =
1
 (rt   ). Substituting (2), (4), and Kt =
xtAt into the Euler equation leads to the dynamic equation of consumption

Ct
Ct
=
1

h
(1    )2 + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t   
i
: (8)
Putting (1), (2) and (4) into (7) gives us the dynamic equation of physical capital

Kt
Kt
= + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t  
Ct
Kt
; (9)
which is essentially the resource constraint.
3Note that HY t (rather than H) enters the budget constraint of the representative consumer. The part HY t of
the total human capital stock H is determined endogenously both by the utility-maximizing behaviors of consumers
and the prot-maximizing behaviors of the rms in the nal-good sector. The other part HAt of H is pinned down
by the market-clearing condition of human capital rather than the optimum in the research sector. If we replace
HY t by H in the FBC, then there will be inconsistancy between the FBC and the resource constraint in competitive
equilibrium.
3
Substituting Kt = xtAt into (6) and taking logrithmic derivative on both sides with respect
to t give us

PAt
PAt
= (+    1)

At
At
+ (  1)

HY t
HY t
+ (1    )

Kt
Kt
:
Plugging (2), (4), and (6) into (3) turns out to

PAt
PAt
= (1    )2 + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t  


HY t;
where  = = (+ ) (1    ). Combining the above two equations and using (5) and (9)
yield us the dynamic equation of HY t:

HY t
HY t
=
(
(1  )(+)
1  
+ 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t +
(1  )+
(1 ) HY t  
(1  )
1 
Ct
Kt
  (1  )H1 
)
: (10)
The dynamic system composed of the four di¤erential equations (5), (8), (9) and (10) describes
the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy, with two state variables (K;A), two control
variables (PA; HY ), and two initial conditions K0; A0.
2.2 Saddle-point stability of the balanced growth path
To study the transitional dynamics implied by the model, we reduce the dimensionality of the
problem from four to three by a change of variable very similar to those used in Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1993), Benhabib and Perli (1994), and Benhabib, Perli and Xie (1994). Thus we
dene yt  
(1  )=(+)Kt=At and qt  Ct=Kt. Since

yt=yt =

Kt=Kt  

At=At and

qt=qt =

Ct=Ct  

Kt=Kt, we have:

yt
yt
= y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
   qt    (H  HY t) ; (11)

HY t
HY t
=
(1    ) (+ )
1  
y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
+
 (1    ) + 
 (1  )
HY t 
1    
1  
qt 
1    
1  
H;
(12)

qt
qt
=
 
(1    )2

  1
!
y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
  


+ qt: (13)
This is a reduced three-dimensional dynamic system in yt, HY t and qt; its dynamics is equivalent
to that of the original four-dimensional system in the sense that its steady states correspond to
the BGPs of the original four-dimensional model. Then the unique steady state (BGP) is solved
as
4
y =
"
HY L
 (1    )2 (1 + )
+ H
# 1
+
; HY =
(+ H)
 (1 + )
; q =
(  H) (1    )2 + (+ H)
(1    )2 (1 + )
:
(14)
Substituting (14) into (5), we solve the equilibrium growth rate on the BGP as
g =
H   
1 + 
; (15)
which is exactly the conjectured equilibrium BGP in Romer (1990).
Before studying the stability of the equilibrium BGP, we talk about the parameter values in
the model. Due to HY 2 (0; H), we know from (14) that
H    > 0: (16)
For the convergence of the objective function on the BGP, we need to impose the restriction
+ (1  ) g > 0, impliying that
 >
H    (1 + )
H
: (17)
Hence if the equilibrium BGP in Romer model makes sense, then the two restrictions on parameter
values, (16) into (17), will be implicitly assumed.
Then we examine the stability of the BGP. For this purpose, we dene zt  y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
,
w1  (1    ) (+ ) = (1  ) and w2  (1    )
2 = 1. Linearizing the three-dimensional
dynamic system composed of (11)-(13) around the steady state (14), we obtain the Jacobian ma-
trix evaluated at the steady state, namely,
J =
2664
  (+ ) z

z
H
Y
+ 

y  y
  (+ )w1z
H

Y
y w1z
 + (1  )+(1 ) H

Y  
1  
1  H

Y
  (+ )w2z
 q
y w2z
 q
H
Y
q
3775 :
It is easy to konw that
det (J) =  
 (+ ) (1    )2 (1 + 1=)
1  
zqHY = 
3
i=1i < 0: (18)
The negative determinant of the Jacobian matrix establishes that two possibilities will occur: (i)
there is one negative eigenvlue and two other eigenvalues with negative real parts; (ii) there is
one negative real eigenvalue and two other eigenvalues with positive real parts. Now we examine
the sign of the trace of the Jacobian matrix,
trace (J) =
(+ H)
8<
:
h
2  2   +  (+ ) +  (1    )2
i
  (H   ) (1  ) (1    )
9=
;
(1 + ) (1  ) (1    )
=
3X
i=1
i: (19)
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Obviously, the denominator of the trace (J) is positive. Then the sign of trace (J) is identical to
its numerator. And the positivity of the numerator is equivalent to the inequality
 >
(1  ) (1    )
A
 

H

1 +
 (1  ) (1    )
A

 ; (20)
where
A  2  2   +  (+ ) +  (1    )2 > 0:
Due to (16), we have
H    (1 + )
H
   =
H   
H
1 +  (1    )2
A
> 0: (21)
Combining equations (17) and (21), we know that (20) holds, which tells that the trace of the
Jacobian matrix is pisitive. Hence case (ii) holds. The number of the stable eigenvalue is equal
to the number the state variable, which establishes that the BGP is saddle-point stable. Given
the initial values of the state variables, the economy converges to the unique steady state along
the uniqe stable manifold.
3 Social planner economy and social optimum
3.1 Optimal growth path
In this section we present the optimal optimum of the Romer (1990) by reviewing the social
planner economy. The social planner maximizes the representative agents objective function
max
Ct;Kt
Z 1
t=0
e t
C1 t   1
1  
dt;
subject to the social resource constraint

Kt = 
+ 1HY tL
K
1 (+)
t A
(+)
t   Ct;
and the knowledge accumulation equation

At = At (H  HY t) ;
with the given initial values of capital and knowledge (K0; A0). Applying Pontryagins maxi-
mum principle and arranging these necessary conditions, we derive the following four-dimensional
dynamic system with respect to Ct, Kt, At and HY t as follows:

Ct
Ct
=
1

h
(1    ) + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t   
i
; (22)
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Kt
Kt
= + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t  
Ct
Kt
; (23)

At
At
=  (H  HY t) ; (24)

HY t
HY t
=
(1    ) + =
(1  )
HY t  
(1    )
1  
Ct
Kt
+
(+ ) H
1  
: (25)
Using the reduction of dimension similar to the above section and setting yt  
(1  )=(+)Kt=At
and qt  Ct=Kt, we obtain the following equivalent three-dimensional dynamic system:

yt
yt
= y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
   qt    (H  HY t) ; (26)

HY t
HY t
=
(1    ) + =
(1  )
HY t  
(1    )
1  
qt +
(+ ) H
1  
; (27)

qt
qt
=

(1    )

  1

y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
  


+ qt: (28)
3.2 Stability of the BGP
The steady state (or BGP) of the social planner economy is solved as
HoY =
  H (1  )
 ( + =)
; yo =

HoY L
 (1    ) ( + )
+ H (+ )
 1
+
; qo =
(
 [ (1    ) + ] 
H (+ ) (1       )
)
(1    ) ( + )
;
(29)
with the optimal growth rate
go =
H   
+ (1 )
; (30)
where   = (+ ). Due to HoY 2 (0; H) and  + (1  ) g
o > 0, we need to impose the
following two assumptions:
H > ;  > 1 

H
: (31)
Dene zt  y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
, 1  (1     + =) = (1  ), 2 = (1    ) = (1  ), and
3  (1    ) =   1. To examine the stability property of the steady state, we linearize the
dynamic system (26)-(28) around the steady state (29) and derive the Jacobian matrix
Jo =
2664
  (+ ) zo

zo
Ho
Y
+ 

yo  yo
0 $1H
o
Y  $2H
o
Y
  (+ )$3z
o qo
yo $3z
o qo
Ho
Y
qo
3775 :
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Under Assumption (31), we nd that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Jo is negative,
det (Jo) =  
 (+ ) [1     +  (1    ) = ()]
1  
zoqoHoY < 0;
and the trace of the Jacobian matrix Jo is positive,
trace (Jo) =
   1

+ H (+ )
 + 
+


+
(1    )+ 
1  
  H (1  )
 + 
> 0;
which establish that there is a stable eigenvalue corresponding to the unique state variable yt of
the dynamic system (26)-(28). Therefore the steady state (or BGP) of the social planner economy
of the Romer model is also a local saddle.
4 Policy analysis
It is easy to know from (15) and (30) that the optimal growth rate is larger than the equilibrium
growth rate, i.e., go > g, which displays that monopoly brings about welfare cost in the de-
centralized economy. Whether there exist appropriate policy instruments improving equilibrium
growth, we will give a denite answer to this question.
Similar to Arnold (2000), we assume that the government has two policy instruments at its
disposal: subsiding each intermediate-good producer s (> 0) dollars per dollar of revenues and
paying a fraction 1  t of the R&D outlays in the research sector. Then the prot-maximization
problem of any intermediate good i is changed into
sit = maxxit
(1 + s)HY tL
 (1    )x1  it   rtxit:
The monopoly pricing formular is solved as
pst =
1
(1    ) (1 + s)
rt; (32)
where 1= (1    ) (1 + s) is the new mark-up. Thus all monopolistic rms earn the same prot
t = (1 + s) (+ ) ptxt. Since the research sector only a¤ords the share t 2 (0; 1) of the wage
cost of the human capital employed in the research sector, the no-arbitrage condition of the
allocation of human capital is changed as
PAtAt = twHt = t
+ 1H 1Y t L
K1  t A
+
t : (33)
The ow budget constraint of the representative consumer is changed as follows

Kt = wHtHY t + wLtL+ rtKt +
Z At
i=0
itdi  Ct   Tt; (34)
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where Tt is the lump-sum tax. Thus the Euler equation is also

Ct
Ct
=
1

(rt   ) : (35)
The balanced budget constraint of the government is
s
Z At
i=0
pitxitdi = Tt: (36)
Combining (2), (32), and (35) gives us the dynamic equation of consumption

Ct
Ct
=
1

h
(1 + s) (1    )2 + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t   
i
: (37)
Plugging (1), (32), and the balanced budget of the government into (34) yields

Kt
Kt
= + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t  
Ct
Kt
: (38)
Substituting (33) and (32) into the di¤erential equation

PAt = rtPAt   t leads to

PAt
PAt
= (1 + s) (1    )2 + 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t  
(1 + s) 

HY t
t
: (39)
Taking logrithmic derivatives with respect to t on both sides of (33) and combining it with (5),
(38) and (39), we know that

HY t
HY t
=
8<
: 11 

t
t
+ (1  )1  [1  (1    ) (1 + s)] 
+ 1HY tL
K
 (+)
t A
(+)
t
  (1  )1 
Ct
Kt
  (1  )H1  +
h
(1    ) + 1+st
i
HY t
1 
9=
; : (40)
Using the same denition as Section 2, we obtain the following dynamic system about (y;Hy; q)
as follows:

yt
yt
= y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
   qt    (H  HY t) ; (41)

HY t
HY t
=
8<
: 11 

t
t
+ (1  )1  [1  (1    ) (1 + s)] y
 (+)
t H

Y tL

 1  1  qt  
1  
1  H +
h
(1    ) + 1+st
i
HY t
1 
9=
; ; (42)

qt
qt
=
"
(1    )2

(1 + s)  1
#
y
 (+)
t H

Y tL
 + qt  


: (43)
To obtain the same allocation as the one of optimal growth path, we compare the dynamic
system with (41)-(43) with the one with (11)-(13). Obviously, if (1 + s) (1    )2 =   1 =
(1    ) =   1, i.e., s = (+ ) = (1    ), then (43) is the same as (13). Substituting
9
s = (+ ) = (1    ) into (42) and comparing it with (10), we know that they are the same
thing if t follows the following di¤erential equation

t
t
=



 
1 + s
t

HY t + H: (44)
Then the steady state of the dynamic system composed of (41)-(44) can be solved as follows:
HY =
  H (1  )
 ( + =)
; y =

HY L
 (1    ) ( + )
+ H (+ )
 1
+
;
 =
  H (1  )
H + +
; q =
 [ (1    ) + ]  H (+ ) (1       )
(1    ) ( + )
:
Then the associated equilibrium growth rate is derived as the optimal growth rate, namely,
g = go =
H   
+ (1 )
; (45)
where   = (+ ). Note that under the implied parameter values in the social planner
economy, we have  2 (0; 1). Therefore, we have found out a monopolistic competition with a
set of policy rules (s; t; Tt) satisfying (36) and (44), which supports the social optimum allocation.
5 Conclusion
In this note, by utilizing the reduction of dimensionality, we prove the existence, uniqueness
and saddle-point stability of the steady state (or BGP) of the Romer (1990) model in both the
decentralized economy and social planner economy. That is, given the initial values of the state
variable, there is a unique stable manifold converging to the unique steady state. Based on
this result, we nd out a set of policy instruments to reduce the welfare cost of the monopoly
production for the producer durables up to social optimum.
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